RETHINKING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BURMA America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. 2 While pundits would argue that the direction this "post-9/11" national strategy has gone is fraught with unknown danger, there is no denying that the decision to pursue this strategy requires America to be an engaged player in the international environment. Gone are the strategic issues associated with the quest for an economic sphere of influence observed at the turn of the twentieth century, of reluctant internationalism following World War I, or of the polarized conflict commonly referred to as the Cold War. Today's national strategy is much more involved, encompassing the realities of a globalized environment and confronting the challenges associated with achieving worldwide stabilization through economic and political inclusion.
At every point in American history, the nation's national strategy has typically embraced concepts containing a pragmatic vision of its role in the world order, of both a way things are and the way things could be. U.S. national strategy has historically encompassed the middle ground between these two beliefs. It was neither the realism of conflict between early twentieth century colonial powers, nor the deliberate establishment of pro-American democratic governments that propelled U.S. national strategy during the administration of Teddy Roosevelt.
Instead it encompassed both, with U.S. national strategy using the diplomatic element to great effect (Venezuelan Affair), as well as the military element as part of its power projection (Great White Fleet). So too was national strategy during the Woodrow Wilson presidency. This period saw not just a strategy of realism reacting to the myopic European imperial view of the world, a view that had contributed to one of the most devastating of world wars, but also a strategy based on the belief that "collective security" could create a new world order (League of Nations)
capable of eliminating the reoccurrence of a similar conflict. American national strategy was most evidently "middle ground" during the Cold War era, an era that required presidents from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan to make realistic decisions permitting support of totalitarian regimes as part of the idealistic goal associated with ridding the international order of communistic dictatorships.
Today's national security policy reflects a world challenged by globalization, technological advances, and a growing divide between the wealthy and poor, as well as between the free and the disenfranchised. Clearly stated, the goals of the 2002 National Security Strategy are, "…to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear:
political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity." 3 One of the many countries feeling the blunt end of the U.S. foreign policy stick is Burma.
Current policies by the United States towards Burma are defined based on the effort to bring about both democratic change and improved conditions in the realm of human rights. But how should U.S. national security strategy be implemented when the object of that strategy is reticent to change? In this type of scenario, the options available to the United States are limited by the unilateral nature of its policies as well as by the higher priority of other present day
American commitments. Using current policies directed at forcing political change in Burma, this paper seeks to resolve this dilemma.
The paper begins with an historical description of events leading to the current U.S. policy directed towards Burma with an emphasis on the country's importance from a regional strategic perspective. Referencing the National Security Strategy and other documents, an analysis will follow regarding this policy and its strengths and weaknesses at effecting desired change. An alternate course that involves seeking a multi-lateral effort will be considered as will one suggesting modification of current policies that potentially induce change in the country while enhancing U.S. theater security. Finally, recommendations, or "ways", for a policy best suited to achieve positive reform, or "ends", in Burma will be suggested.
Background
An independent country since 1948, Burma has been controlled for most of its history by a military junta, currently referring to itself as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
While the country is comprised of seven states representing seven major ethnic or religious groups, the base of the SPDC's power resides within the predominantly Burmese/Bhuddist majority. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Burma had been a British colony. However, unlike many of Great Britain's other colonial possessions, Burma's post-war military leadership, or Burma Independence Army, was trained by the country's Japanese occupation forces. 4 This situation led to an atmosphere of military superiority in the handling of internal political unrest.
With a string of weak civilian administrations immediately following independence, coupled with the challenges associated with multiple insurgencies, control of the daily functioning of the government continued to evolve as a military responsibility.
The post-Independence period saw numerous efforts at civilian governmental control with commensurate attempts at democratic reform. On every occasion, these efforts were punctuated by continued internal conflict leading to military intervention. Coups in 1958 Coups in , 1962 Coups in , and 1988 were all conducted following the failure of the civilian government to address perceived developmental ineffectiveness and internal unrest. Further supporting a view of military elitism was the success of these military regimes in holding together the multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups that formed greater Burma through negotiated ceased fires with insurgent elements. That the government was able to accomplish this task while providing tangible infrastructure improvements further added to its self-confidence. With a self-perceived view of its own popularity in solving the nation's problems, the junta in 1990 experimented once again with democratic reforms. But the 1990 democratic elections exposed the military's inability to understand the popularity of a civilian ruled, democratically elected government, and also led to the most egregious display of military authoritarianism seen since independence. proclaimed that the Asia-Pacific region was rapidly becoming, "…the global community's 'center of gravity'", he discussed the importance of every country in the PACOM area of responsibility, with one exception. 13 His omission of Burma represents the lack of a congruent U.S. policy aimed at promoting democratic and human rights changes. This void in acknowledging Burma's geopolitical importance, while perhaps desired by those seeking to use isolation as a policy tool, has succeeded only in minimizing U.S. efforts to achieve substantive change.
Of equal importance for U.S. policymakers, Burma also stands out as a regional lynch pin in ongoing challenges associated with transnational crime, the illicit drug trade, illegal immigration, piracy, weapons proliferation, and the potential safe haven for non-state actors. In short, both because of these concerns and the importance of its geopolitical location, Burma is a country that cannot be ignored if successful implementation of U.S. national security strategy is to occur. The challenge and frustration for U.S. policymakers, therefore, is how to successfully implement the correct national policy towards the GOB that achieves the idealistic goals of democratic reform while supporting the more realistic demands benefiting U.S. long term strategic interests. As stated by a senior diplomat, "The currents of change, spawned by the post-Cold War world and globalization and gestated by the war on terrorism, have been flowing in varying directions. This presents new threats and opportunities for U.S. foreign policy." 14 It is the response to these "new threats and opportunities" that makes rethinking U.S. policy towards
Burma not just an option, but a necessity.
Staying the Course
A milk and water righteousness unbacked by force is to the full as wicked as and even more mischievous than force divorced from righteousness. -Theodore Roosevelt 15 Current U.S. sanctions policy levied towards Burma stems from the latter's history of failed democratic reforms and human rights abuses. Maintaining this strategic policy fulfills the idealistic mandate as stated in the United States National Security Strategy calling on the U.S.
to, "…encourage the rule of law, human rights, and meaningful economic and political participation." 16 From a pragmatic perspective, however, this policy has resulted in no tangible commitment on the part of the Burmese government to effect democratic and social change.
Instead, what has been observed is a strengthening of economic power and influence by Burma's regional trading partners at U.S. expense.
The cause of this strategic failure stems from the unilateral nature of these sanctions. In effect, by "going it alone", the United States has regrettably removed itself from the engagement process. What has occurred has been greater involvement with Burma by countries enjoying the opportunities permitted by this lack of U.S. engagement. This involvement has included increased trade and investment by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India; substantial financial investment from Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore; and rising tourism from many countries of the European Union (EU). The suggestion that the United Nations represents a forum for encouraging change is equally unfounded. Explanation for an apparent reluctance in pursuing sanctions through the U.N. can be attributed in part to Article 2 of the United Nations Charter that states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state….
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Further complicating successful pursuit of a UN-authorized sanctions policy is that such a policy would in all probability require approval of the UN Security Council which, "…may decide what measures not i nvolving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions…" 29 With the economic interests of China at stake, the likelihood of such sanctions being implemented through the Security Council remains problematic. 30 Tragically, the configuration of power and interests inside Myanmar is not conducive to major, immediate change-and the international community has no "magic bullets" no realistic policy options that might alter this. What are needed instead are efforts over the longer term to change political, social, and economic realities in ways that facilitate domestic pressure and capacity for reform. 32 To establish a framework for successful resolution, U.S. strategic policymakers must take a more pragmatic view in dealing with the Burmese regime, one that supports the use of evidenced where a similar strategy is being conducted, this type of engagement will allow U.S.
influence to reach many levels of Burmese society. 38 It therefore stands that this pragmatic approach represents a viable alternative that would best provide both a realistic method for affecting change within Burma, and the potential to best support idealistic efforts towards future democratic change.
Effectively initiating a policy of constructive engagement will require patience, and the development of a plan for implementation that maximizes this effort's positive effects for both the United States and Burma. In order to achieve these results, a more complete understanding of the make-up of Burmese governmental control must exist to include the current framework for constitutional reform. Equally important is the ability for policymakers to deemphasize the Burmese ex-patriot community's strong lobbying efforts and instead endorse Aung Sang Suu
Kyi's willingness to work with the GOB. 39 Also of importance is acceptance of the diminished influence of the NLD on both the national and international stage.
In order to effectively influence change in Burma, U.S. policymakers must take full advantage of all the elements of national power. The recent release of National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD-44), mandates that the Secretary of State manage, "…improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife." 40 Under the auspices of this Presidential Directive, the Department of State will become the supported agency in managing this constructive engagement strategy while the Department of Defense and USAID will provide a supporting role. This will have a dual effect of enhancing relations between the GOB and DOS while optimizing the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of U.S. national strategy. 41 If the goal is to gain influence in Burma, and with it enhanced opportunities to influence peaceful transition to a more democratic government, then constructive engagement represents the means with which to make this happen.
Those knowledgeable regarding Burmese politics understand the challenges associated with initiating a new American engagement policy. Overcoming the diplomatic hurdles that are a result of current American sanctions policies is substantial even without the added degree of difficulty associated with building mutual trust and a positive communicative environment. But with time, a clear focus on policy implementation, and a commitment to engagement through these "supported" and "supporting" agencies, the outcome of these efforts can prove to be both positive and mutually beneficial.
Implementing the New Policy
A long-term pragmatic approach will be required if constructive engagement is to be achieved. The first step will be to convince U.S. policymakers that changing policy directed at Burma is in the best interests of the United States. To sway U.S. policy makers will require both the Administration's reassessment of Burma's strategic importance and a willingness to pursue a more open dialogue with the Burmese regime. The second step will require a reassessment of constructive engagement programs as they pertain to the country. This second effort will require buy-in from United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and USAID. Equally, if not more importantly, it will require both USPACOM and USAID to better understand the regime and the relationship to its neighbors in South and Southeast Asia. Following this reassessment, USPACOM and USAID must take full advantage of their strengths in the realm of constructive engagement if these organizations are to succeed in both influencing the Burmese regime and countering the growing influence of Burma's neighbors.
A Case for Constructive Engagement
Engagement activity includes diplomatic, economic, and military activities or operations conducted to achieve U.S. national-security objectives. Engagement requirements are situational and can change rapidly. Each engagement element provides an essential contribution to the overall engagement effort--but the various elements are not always, or necessarily, substitutes for one another. Similarly, diplomatic or economic agreements are not always or necessarily substitutes for military presence and engagement. 42 In its many forms constructive engagement is the "means" by which the elements "ways" of national power are exercised to obtain desired regional affects "ends." These ends can be political (human rights improvement, democratic change), informational, military (training, The use of all U.S. elements of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America's role in the world that will best achieve the nation's core grand strategic objectives. 52 Today's national security strategy has undergone yet another change in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment. This environment has been affected by the rate at which change in the global environment is occurring along with the fear this change engenders in a world where half of its population lives below the poverty line. To achieve agreement in the international environment now requires greater engagement between governments. As it pertains to nations seeking agreement at the strategic level, reaching agreement consists of overcoming, "Ideological differences, cultural misperceptions, and the bitter nature of…mutual suspicion and hostility…" 53 Citing current national security perspectives vis-à-vis the United States and Burma, this paper has described concepts and principles needed to effect successful engagement. It has critiqued current policies to include political and economic sanctions which have unarguably fallen short of their desired goals . Although these policies were designed in response to an idealistic desire to create democratic change in an autocratic regime, and to influence improvements in human rights, the reality is that they have had an entirely opposite effect.
Making matters worse, U.S. sanctions policies have forced the Burmese government to pursue closer relations with some countries unsupportive of the desired end state of political reform and enhanced human rights.
Seeking change in the nature of Burma's government through a multilateral approach has been discussed. Although this choice represents perhaps the best of desired options, the inability and reluctance of governments to achieve consensus directed at Burma points to the political and economic interests driving each nation's national policies. Substantiating the international community's reticence towards forcing the democratization of a "legitimate" government, this paper has pointed to the lack of action taken against Burma by both the United Nations and through ASEAN.
To establish a framework for successful engagement, U.S. policymakers must take a more pragmatic view in dealing with the Burmese regime. 2 "America will stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.
"The United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else. That is one of the main differences between us and our enemies. They seek to impose and expand an empire of oppression, in which a tiny group of brutal, selfappointed rulers control every aspect of every life. Our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace.
"That advance has great momentum in our time --shown by women voting in Afghanistan, and Palestinians choosing a new direction, and the people of Ukraine asserting their democratic rights and electing a president. We are witnessing landmark events in the history of liberty. And in the coming years, we will add to that story." President George W. Bush 
